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ABSTRACT
We expose the vulnerability of an emerging wireless rang-
ing technology, impulse radio ultra-wide band (IR-UWB),
to distance-decreasing attacks on the physical communica-
tion layer (PHY). These attacks violate the security of se-
cure ranging protocols that allow two wireless devices to se-
curely estimate the distance between them, with the guar-
antee that the estimate is an upper-bound on the actual
distance. Such protocols serve as crucial building blocks
in security-sensitive applications such as location tracking,
physical access control, or localization.
Prior works show the theoretical possibility of PHY at-
tacks bypassing cryptographic mechanisms used by secure
ranging protocols. They also demonstrates that for physical
layers used in ISO 14443 RFID and wireless sensor networks,
some PHY attacks are indeed feasible. IR-UWB was pro-
posed as a possible solution, but we show that the de facto
standard for IR-UWB, IEEE 802.15.4a, does not automat-
ically provide security against such attacks. We ﬁnd that
with the mandatory modes of the standard an external at-
tacker can decrease the measured distance by as much as
140 meters with a high probability (above 99%).
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer - Communication Networks]: Gen-
eral—Security and Protection
General Terms
Performance, Security
1. INTRODUCTION
Secure ranging [1–13] allows a (wireless) device to esti-
mate, in a secure manner, the distance from itself to another
device. More speciﬁcally, the measured distance provides an
upper-bound on the actual distance (hence the name distance
bounding used by many authors), even if the protocol is ex-
ecuted in the presence of an adversary that is trying to in-
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terfere with the ranging process. This makes secure ranging
a crucial building block for many security-sensitive services
and applications. One example is the tracking of goods and
people [14]. Consider a valuable item, such as a Swiss watch,
equipped with a wireless-enabled (RFID) tag. The watch is
displayed in a store equipped with a monitoring system that
executes secure ranging with the tag every few seconds. If
anyone tries to move the watch beyond some distance from
the monitoring system, an alarm is triggered. Other ex-
amples include RFID access control [15], secure neighbor
discovery [16], secure time synchronization [17], and secure
localization [6].
In previous work, Clulow et al. [18] point out physical
layer (PHY ) attacks as a possible attack vector against se-
cure ranging. These attacks make it possible even for an ex-
ternal adversary to decrease the estimated distance without
breaking any cryptographic primitives or protocols. In [19]
Hancke and Kuhn demonstrat with a proof-of-concept im-
plementation that some of these attacks are indeed feasible
for the ISO 14443 PHY and a compliant RFID receiver,
as well as for 433MHz ASK/FSK modulation and a super-
heterodyne receiver, common in wireless sensor networks.
Nevertheless, PHY attacks are, by nature, PHY-speciﬁc.
Therefore, the results of [18,19] cannot be mapped easily to
other PHYs – separate investigations to quantify the eﬀect
of PHY attacks are required. One PHY particularly worth
such an investigation is the emerging, yet promising rang-
ing technology: Impulse Radio Ultra-Wideband (IR-UWB).
The deﬁning feature of IR-UWB is the use of nanosecond
pulses, which gives it unmatched capabilities of high (sub-
meter) precision indoor ranging, even in dense multi-path
environments [20]. Indeed, the recently proposed standard
for IR-UWB, IEEE 802.15.4a [21, 22], is the only wireless
standard that has been speciﬁcally designed for ranging ap-
plications. Further, this standard even includes an optional
private ranging mode meant to enable ranging in the pres-
ence of an adversary. Using IR-UWB is also proposed in [18]
as a way to mitigate PHY attacks, because of its potential
for use of very short symbols. From the application per-
spective, IR-UWB is envisioned to be used for tracking and
access control with a new generation of RFID [14], as well
as high-precision localization [20], including secure localiza-
tion [23]. Undoubtedly, other security sensitive applications
will emerge as the technology matures. All of this makes IR-
UWB a natural candidate for the PHY of a secure ranging
protocol, as is pointed out in [4]. Understanding the impact
of PHY attacks on IR-UWB clearly is of utter importance.
This is precisely the problem we address in this paper.
Our main contributions and ﬁndings are:
 The ﬁrst investigation and quantiﬁcation of the
security of IR-UWB ranging against PHY attacks.
We investigate the IEEE 802.15.4a [21, 22] standard, focus-
ing on its mandatory modes, and a non-coherent energy-
detector [24,25], which is a realistic receiver for the RFID ap-
plications we are interested in (cost- and complexity-wise).
We devise a distance-decreasing relay attack, which an exter-
nal adversary can use to decrease the measured distance by
up to 140m.1 By increasing the signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR),
the attack success rate can be made arbitrarily large. In
particular, a success rate of around 99% requires the adver-
sary to operate only at a slightly higher SNR (a few dB)
than needed for normal system operation. This is easily
achievable by using a high-gain antenna, by transmitting at
a power exceeding the regulatory limit, or by simply moving
the adversarial devices closer to the victim devices.
 The ﬁrst study of PHY attacks that encompassed
the complete process of packet reception. PHY pack-
ets typically consist of two distinct parts: the payload that
carries the actual information bits and a preamble that is
used to acquire the packet and determine the packet time-
of-arrival. We show that in order to mount a distance de-
creasing attack, it is not enough to attack the payload part
of a PHY packet but that the attack also has to be extended
to the preamble. To the best of our knowledge, this has not
been considered in any previous works.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In
Section 2 we introduce the IR-UWB PHY of IEEE.802.15.4a
as well as the energy-detection receiver that we use in our
evaluation. In Section 3, we design physical layer attacks
tailored to this PHY and receiver. In Section 4 we evalu-
ate the eﬀectiveness of the proposed attacks with detailed
physical layer simulations (due to very limited availability of
IR-UWB hardware). In Section 5 we discuss possible coun-
termeasures, elaborate on some of the assumptions, and ex-
plain why the private ranging mode of the standard is not
resilient against the proposed attack. Finally, we conclude
in Section 6.
2. SYSTEM MODEL
We assume that devices engaging in a secure ranging pro-
tocol share the necessary cryptographic material, and that
they are equipped with an IEEE 802.15.4a compliant re-
ceiver and transmitter. The choice of transmitter is of little
consequence to our investigation, any standard-compliant
transmitter is acceptable [26, 27]. The architecture of the
receiver used by honest devices is described in Section 2.3.
The IEEE 802.15.4a standard contains a myriad of de-
tails. For the reader’s convenience, whenever applicable, we
ﬁrst provide information that is essential for understand-
ing the paper. Then, for completeness, we provide details
(denoted as such throughout the paper) that can be skipped
1Revisiting the tracking example, we can clearly see the
threat this attack poses: An adversary can use it to con-
vince the store monitoring system that the watch is within
the store premises, whereas in reality it is in the adversary’s
pocket more than one block away. This attack is also quite
easy to mount, as the adversary does not need to detach the
tag from the item, or to corrupt the tag, or to break any
cryptographic primitives or protocols. Further, jamming or
destroying the tag are not an option, as the monitoring sys-
tem will set oﬀ an alarm if it cannot hear from the tag.
mode Tpsym Tsync Tsfd Tpre Tsym
LPRF 3968ns 254μs 31.8μs 285.8μs 1024ns
HPRF 992ns 63.5μs 7.9μs 71.4μs 1024ns
Table 1: IEEE 802.15.4a mandatory modes.
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Figure 1: IEEE 802.15.4a preamble structure.
by a casual reader; they are necessary only to understand
some subtle points in the attack design and performance.
Note that we omit some less relevant information altogether
(in particular, features of the standard designed with only
coherent receivers in mind).
2.1 IEEE 802.15.4a
IEEE 802.15.4 [21] is a standard for low-rate wireless per-
sonal area networks (WPAN). The 802.15.4a amendment
[22] deﬁnes an IR-UWB PHY allowing for low-rate com-
munication and high precision ranging, using a number of
500MHz or 1.5GHz bandwidth channels from approximately
3GHz to 10GHz. Because of the ultrawide-band nature of
this PHY, the transmitting power is signiﬁcantly limited by
regulation. This results in a relatively low communication
range (20-30m). The standard does not specify a particular
transmitter or receiver implementation, nevertheless it pro-
vides recommendations on the suitability of various modes
for diﬀerent receivers and channels.
Mandatory modes. The IEEE 802.15.4a standard is
very ﬂexible, allowing for many combinations of parameter
values. However, only two of these combinations need to
be implemented by a standard compliant device: one LPRF
and one HPRF mode (high/low pulse repetition frequency).
We argue that the majority of devices are likely to imple-
ment only these mandatory modes and we therefore focus
on these. The parameters of the mandatory modes most
important for our investigation are summarized in Table 1.
2.1.1 Preamble
Essentials. An IEEE 802.15.4a packet is composed of a
preamble followed by a payload part. The preamble (Fig. 1),
of duration Tpre, is further composed of a SYNC part of du-
ration Tsync and the start frame delimiter (SFD) of duration
Tsfd. The SYNC part is used for packet detection, timing ac-
quisition and channel estimation; the SFD marks the start
of the payload. The SYNC part consists of Npsym = 64
identical preamble symbols Si. The SFD is a sequence of
Nsfd = 8 preamble symbols [0, Si, 0,−Si, Si, 0, 0,−Si]. The
duration of a preamble symbol is Tpsym = 3968ns (LPRF)
or 992ns (HPRF).
Details. A preamble symbol Si is built from a ternary
preamble code Ci = {−1, 0, 1}Npcode , of length Npcode =
31. More precisely, Si is composed of Npcode code sym-
bols, each consisting of L = 64 chips in the case of LPRF
0 symbol 1 symbol
Tspread Tspread
Figure 2: BPPM modulation from the receiver’s
perspective: The integrator output samples are
shown and the channel delay spread Tspread is high-
lighted. The channel is NLOS, as indicated by the
strongest path component being delayed with re-
spect to the symbol start.
or L = 16 chips in the case of HPRF: The ﬁrst chip be-
ing Ci, and the remaining L − 1 being 0. Index i indicates
which of the predeﬁned codes to use. The duration of Si
is Tpsym = NpcodeLTc, where Tc is the duration of a chip,
ﬁxed to Tc = 2.0032ns; in the rest of the paper, for conve-
nience, we assume that Tc = 2ns. This, the duration of a
code symbol equals LTc = 128ns (LPRF) and LTc = 32ns
(HPRF). Assuming p(t) is the pulse shape of a single pulse,
and dj = [0, 1, 0,−1, 1, 0, 0,−1] is the sequence deﬁning the
SFD, the signal transmitted in the preamble is:
s(t) =
Npsym∑
j=1
Npcode∑
k=1
C
(k)
i p(t− kLTc − jTpsym)
+
8∑
j=1
Npcode∑
k=1
djC
(k)
i p(t− kLTc − jTpsym − Tsync) (1)
2.1.2 Payload
Essentials. The payload is composed of symbols, each
carrying one bit of information. The modulation format is
Binary Pulse Position Modulation (BPPM ): for a 0 bit, a
pulse is sent in the ﬁrst part of the symbol (the 0-block); for
a 1 bit, a pulse is sent in the second part (the 1-block), see
Fig. 2. The duration of a payload symbol is Tsym = 1024ns.
Details. More speciﬁcally, a symbol (Fig. 3) consists
of Nc = 512 chips and has a duration of Tsym = NcTc =
1024ns. It is divided into 4 blocks of equal duration: the 0-
block, the 1-block and two guard blocks. The guard blocks
serve as a means to prevent inter-symbol interference (ISI).
For a 0 bit, a burst of Ncpb = 4 (LPRF) or 16 (HPRF) pulses
is sent in the 0-block; for a 1 bit, the burst is sent in the 1-
block. In addition, the burst is shifted by a time-hopping oﬀ-
set δn < Nc/4, according to a publicly known time-hopping
sequence. Finally, the signal is scrambled according to a
publicly known scrambling sequence βn,j ∈ {−1, 1}. Thus,
the signal transmitted for the nth bit bn ∈ {0, 1} is:
s(t) =
∑Ncpb
j=1 βn,jp(t− jTc − δnTc − bnTsym/2) (2)
The maximum allowable packet size is 1016 data bits. Be-
fore modulation, the data is encoded using a (55,63) Reed-
Solomon (RS) code, yielding a maximum number of 1208
coded bits per packet. The raw data bitrate is 0.85Mb/s.
2.1.3 Private Ranging Mode
The standard includes a private ranging mode whose main
purpose is to prevent an adversary from learning sensitive
ranging information. To this end the private ranging mode
allows for the encryption of timestamp information that is
0-block 1-blockguard guard
… … … …
Tc = 2ns ?n Ncpb
Figure 3: IEEE 802.15.4a payload symbol structure.
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Figure 4: Energy-detection receiver architecture.
exchanged during the ranging process. More importantly,
the preamble codes used in the ranging packets are secretly
agreed on by the legitimate participants. However, this pro-
vides a very minor increase in security, because the nodes are
only allowed to choose from a set of 8 predeﬁned preamble
codes. We explain this in detail in Section 5.
2.2 Multipath Channel
Essentials. We adopt the multiple propagation path
channel model, which is commonly used for UWB. Under
this model, a number of time-delayed, phase-shifted and at-
tenuated copies of the transmitted signal arrive at the re-
ceiver. More speciﬁcally, we make use of two channel models
appended to the IEEE 802.15.4a standard [28]: the residen-
tial non-line-of-sight (NLOS) model, and the oﬃce line-of-
sight (LOS) model. For our purpose, the main characteristic
of interest is the channel delay spread Tspread – the dura-
tion over which the channel distributes most of the energy
(Fig. 2). The channel delay spreads are TNLOSspread ≈ 60ns and
TLOSspread ≈ 30ns, respectively.
Details. The transmitted signal s(t), deﬁned by (1) (for
the preamble) or (2) (for the payload) is transformed by the
channel into the received signal:
r(t) = s(t) ∗ h(t− ν) + n(t) (3)
n(t) accounts for thermal noise assumed to be additive white
Gaussian (AWGN), ν is the unknown propagation delay
(corresponding to line-of-sight propagation), ∗ denotes con-
volution, and h(t) captures the response of the multipath
channel and is deﬁned according to the tapped-delay-line
model as:
h(t) =
L∑
l=1
αlδ(t− τl) (4)
where L is the number of propagation paths, αl is the at-
tenuation coeﬃcient and τl is the delay induced by the lth
propagation path, and δ is the Dirac delta function.
2.3 Baseline Receiver
Essentials. We consider a non-coherent energy-detection
receiver composed of an antenna, a bandpass ﬁlter of band-
width B, followed by a squaring device and an integrator
(Fig. 4). The integrator outputs a discrete time sample ev-
ery T = Tc = 2ns.
Details. The discrete samples at the integrator output
of the receiver are denoted by ym,n. During the reception
of the preamble, ym,n denotes the mth sample of the nth
code symbol of the preamble. During reception of the pay-
load, ym,n denotes the mth sample of the nth symbol of the
payload (Fig. 2). These samples are given by:
ym,n =
∫ (m+1)T+α(n)
mT+α(n)
[r(t)]2 dt, (5)
where α(n) = nLTc+ν during the preamble, α(n) = nTsym+
δnTc+ν during the payload, and ν is the propagation delay.
For noise-only parts of r(t), the samples ym,n are dis-
tributed independently and according to a chi-square distri-
bution with 2BT degrees of freedom. If r(t) contains contri-
butions from the transmitted signal, then ym,n is distributed
according to a non-central chi-square distribution with 2BT
degrees of freedom and a non-centrality parameter pm,n that
depends on the channel response [24,25].
Motivation. We deem this receiver to be a realistic solu-
tion for RFID in terms of complexity, cost and performance.
We chose a non-coherent energy-detection receiver [24,25,29]
over a complex coherent rake receiver because of its reduced
complexity. [The large number of resolvable multipath com-
ponents of the UWB channel impose ﬁne channel estimation
and stringent timing requirements [30] on coherent rake re-
ceivers, which makes them hard to implement on the small
and cheap active tags that we consider.] Nevertheless, the
considered receiver has a suﬃciently high sampling rate to
allow for precise ranging. It has also been shown to have
optimal performance in this class of receivers [24] and to be
quite robust to multi-user interference [25].
Alternative Receivers. We also investigate resilience
of sub-optimal energy-detector receivers: performing SFD
detection based on a correlation with a template derived
from the SFD sequence (similar to the timing acquisition
method explained in Section 2.3.1), and demodulating with-
out weighting by the channel energy-delay proﬁle (see Sec-
tion 2.3.2). They are also vulnerable to the attack, as we
brieﬂy report in Section 4.
2.3.1 Synchronization
Essentials. Synchronization allows the receiver to detect
the presence of a packet on the wireless channel and to deter-
mine the beginning of the packet. This is necessary both for
decoding the payload and for establishing the packet time-of-
arrival, based on which the measured distance is estimated.
Infrastructure-less packet based wireless networks typically
lack global synchronization. Thus synchronization has to be
performed on a packet-per-packet basis. In IEEE 802.15.4a,
this is done with the help of the known preamble sequence
(Section 2.1.1).
To detect the presence of a packet on the wireless chan-
nel, the receiver employs a process called timing acquisition.
This allows the receiver to discover where the boundaries of
the Si symbols fall and thus learn the time-of-arrival modulo
Tpsym. Due to random factors, such as the channel impulse
response and the noise, some Si symbols might be corrupted.
Hence, based on timing acquisition alone, the receiver can-
not be certain about the number of Si symbols needed to
acquire timing and thus the exact time-of-arrival.
After the timing acquisition phase, the receiver can per-
form channel estimation: Based on a small number of Si
symbols, it estimates the energy-delay proﬁle of the chan-
nel. This proﬁle allows for the decoding performance, as
well as ranging accuracy, to signiﬁcantly improve.
After the channel estimation phase, the receiver goes into
the SFD detection mode, and begins to look for the special
signal sequence given by the SFD. The SFD marks the end
of the preamble and the beginning of the payload. It thus
allows for the time-of-arrival to be determined exactly, elim-
inating the uncertainty remaining after timing acquisition.
Once the SFD is found, the receiver starts demodulating and
decoding the payload. The exact method the receiver uses
to detect the SFD is described below: It is essential that
the receiver utilizes the full length of the SFD sequence, for
maximum performance.
Details. During timing acquisition, the receiver corre-
lates the received signal with a template derived from the
known preamble code sequence. The presence of a preamble
on the channel is detected if the correlation exceeds a cer-
tain threshold. In practice, this process usually takes about
one third of the Npsym preamble symbols. The algorithm
used in the receiver is the baseline algorithm from [31]; for
further details the interested reader is referred there. Chan-
nel estimation involves estimating the energy-delay proﬁle
of the channel (from which the non-centrality parameters
pm,n can be derived [25]). The energy-delay proﬁle of the
channel is estimated by averaging the received signal over a
small number of Si symbols.
During SFD detection, the receiver looks at a sliding win-
dow containing the last Nsfd = 8 received preamble symbols.
The length of this window thus corresponds to the length of
the SFD sequence. Given the preamble structure of IEEE
802.15.4a, only 9 diﬀerent sequences of 8 preamble symbols
can possibly be observed2. The ﬁrst sequence (Si, Si, Si,
Si, Si, Si, Si, Si) occurs if the window is fully inside the
SYNC part of the preamble. The second sequence (Si, Si,
Si, Si, Si, Si, Si, 0) is observed if the window contains 7
preamble symbols from the SYNC part and the ﬁrst symbol
of the SFD. The third sequence (Si, Si, Si, Si, Si, Si, 0, Si)
is observed if the window contains 6 preamble symbols from
the SYNC part and the ﬁrst two symbols from the SFD.
In total we thus have 9 possible observations, the last one
corresponding to the SFD sequence (0, Si, 0, Si, Si, 0, 0,
Si). The receiver employs the maximum likelihood criterion
(based on the channel estimation phase) in order to deter-
mine which of the 9 possible sequences is the most likely for
the observation currently within the sliding window. If the
most likely sequence corresponds to the SFD sequence, de-
tection of the SFD is declared and reception of the payload
starts.
2.3.2 Payload Demodulation
Essentials. Payload symbol demodulation is performed
by weighting the received signal with the estimated channel
energy-delay proﬁle and then by comparing the energies in
the 0-block and in the 1-block of the symbol.
Details. More precisely, demodulation of the n-th pay-
load bit, bn, is done according to the decision rule:
M−1∑
m=0
ym,n · pm,n
bn=0
≷
bn=1
M−1∑
m=0
y
m+Nc2 ,n
· pm,n (6)
where the parameter M deﬁnes the number of chips that the
receiver takes into consideration to account for the channel
delay spread. Such a decision rule corresponds to a linear
approximation of the maximum likelihood ratio test [24,25].
2Note that with a non-coherent receiver, the negative sym-
bols are ﬂipped to positive due to the squaring operation.
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Figure 5: Example secure ranging protocol.
Device A estimates the distance to device B with the
formula dAB = c(tRTT − tTA)/2, where c is the chan-
nel propagation speed. MACAB stands for Message
Authentication Code with a symmetric key shared
between A and B, NA and NB are freshly generated
nonces, tTA is a constant turn-around time that A
and B know, and tRTT is the round-trip-time mea-
sured by A.
3. DISTANCE-DECREASING ATTACK
Secure ranging (distance bounding) protocols [1–13] are,
in general, developed without a particular physical layer in
mind. Essentially, they are cryptographic protocols built on
top of “traditional” ranging that measures the distance be-
tween two devices based on message time-of-ﬂight (Fig. 5).
Secure ranging protocols augment ranging messages with
bit-strings cryptographically bound to a secret shared by
the devices. (The binding is typically sealed with additional
messages.) This prevents an external adversary from inject-
ing bogus messages (spooﬁng) and thus interfering with the
ranging process.
Many distance bounding protocols go one step further,
and attempt to thwart internal attacks: a misbehaving ranged
device (traditionally called a prover) that convinces the rang-
ing device (verifier) that it is closer than it actually is. Such
protocols include, for the most part3, a rapid-bit-exchange
phase (RBE): The veriﬁer sends a number of single bit chal-
lenges, to which the prover must respond instantly. Such
unusual requirements make these protocols diﬃcult to im-
plement.4 In particular, an IEEE 802.15.4a implementation
of RBE would not only be extremely ineﬃcient, as every bit
would have to be preﬁxed with a (relatively long) preamble
– it would also be open to packet-level attacks considered
in [18].
In contrast, protocols that attempt only to prevent ex-
ternal attacks [6, 7] rely on a small number (typically 2) of
ranging messages that are several bits long. An example
of such a protocol is the protocol in Fig. 5. Such proto-
cols can be easily implemented on IEEE 802.15.4a compli-
ant devices. Furthermore, security against external attacks
is suﬃcient in many applications (e.g., the tracking scenario
from the Introduction). Finally, an external PHY attack is
more challenging to mount than an internal one: The early
detection (ED) and late commit (LC) components of the
distance-decreasing relay attack [18], which we devise in this
section, can be used individually by a malicious prover to
3A recent proposal [10] shows that the RBE can be replaced
by a full-duplex transmission in protocols that provide se-
curity against internal attacks
4To this date, no implementation of RBE for wireless net-
works exists.
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Figure 6: Distance-decreasing relay attack setup.
mount an internal attack. For all these reasons, we focus on
external PHY attacks and on secure ranging protocols that
employ several-bits-long ranging messages unpredictable by
the adversary (like the protocol in Fig. 5).
3.1 Threat Model
We consider an external adversary mounting a distance-
decreasing relay attack between two honest devices, A and
B, that execute a secure ranging protocol (Fig. 6). The
adversary uses two devices MA and MB , where A can com-
municate directly only with MA and B can communicate di-
rectly only with MB .
5 Furthermore, MA and MB exchange
information using an out-of-band adversarial channel. The
IEEE 802.15.4a channel propagation speed is c, the speed of
light. The same speed is assumed for the adversarial chan-
nel.
The adversarial devices are equipped with transmitters
similar to the honest devices, but able to send non-standard-
compliant pulse sequences, and to ignore regulatory trans-
mission limits. Their receivers extend the baseline archi-
tecture (Section 2.3) and can be equipped with high gain
antennas. Hence, the adversary is able to increase the SNR
observed by both adversarial and honest devices. Note that
such an increase in received SNR can also be achieved by the
adversary moving its devices closer to the honest devices.
We focus on the exchange of a single ranging message,
during which one of the honest devices acts as a transmitter
(HTX) and the other one as a receiver (HRX), as depicted in
Fig. 6. Accordingly, the adversarial devices act as a receiver
(ARX), and as a transmitter (ATX). It is easy to extend
this attack to an entire secure ranging protocol. The ad-
versary simply mounts the distance-decreasing relay attack
on all ranging messages. Any non-ranging messages of the
protocol, which are not time critical, can be relayed in an
arbitrary fashion.
3.2 Attack Principle
For the relay attack to be distance-decreasing, the adver-
sary needs to “shift” the relayed message back in time by
some oﬀset trelay > 0, which we call the relay time-gain
(Fig. 7). The amount by which the measured distance is de-
creased is c · trelay, assuming an optimal (for the adversary)
conﬁguration where ARX and ATX lie on a line between
HTX and HRX.6 This distance decrease is reduced by any
additional processing delays the adversary introduces (Sec-
tion 3.5).
The diﬃculty in mounting this attack is twofold: (1) ATX
needs to begin the transmission of the preamble before it
learns from ARX when HTX started the transmission. (2)
ATX needs to transmit the payload before it learns what
bits the payload carries. Existing work has focused exclu-
sively on the second problem [18, 19], but the ﬁrst one is
5We elaborate on this assumption in Section 5.
6In other conﬁgurations the distance decrease will be
smaller. Note that the choice of the conﬁguration rests with
the adversary.
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preamble payload
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Figure 7: Overview of the distance-decreasing relay
attack. ARX and ATX are assumed to lie on a line
between HRX an d HTX. The thick dotted arrow
indicates time-of-arrival corresponding to the actual
distance between HTX and HRX.
equally important: Without shifting the time-of-arrival at
HRX, attacks on the payload are in vain.
The ﬁrst problem might seem simpler, because the ad-
versary knows the content of the preamble. However, in
general, the adversary cannot know when HTX will begin
the transmission. Although ATX can always choose to begin
the transmission at a random time, there is a good chance
it either does this too late, resulting in a distance increase,
or too early, such that the the distance-decreasing attack
on the payload fails (see paragraph below). Even if neither
is the case, the achieved time-gain is random, which might
lead to undesired results, e.g., negative distance estimates.
Naturally, the preamble and the payload must be relayed
with the same time-gain. This implies that the upper-bound
on the achievable time-gain is the minimum of (1) the upper-
bound on the time-gain for the preamble and (2) the upper-
bound of the time-gain for the payload. As we will see
shortly, the payload upper-bound is more strict and deter-
mines the achievable relay-gain.
3.3 Attack on the Preamble
The attack on the preamble is depicted in Fig. 8. For clar-
ity of presentation, we assume the distance between ARX
and ATX to be 0. When HTX sends a packet, ARX per-
forms the synchronization procedure, exactly as the base-
line receiver. Upon timing acquisition, ARX learns (modulo
Tpsym) the time at which it began receiving the packet, which
we denote by t0. Deviating from the baseline receiver, ARX
performs early SFD detection: ARX chooses an early SFD
detection delay tSFDED and acts on the ﬁrst t
SFD
ED /Tc samples of
every received preamble symbol. [Details: ARX performs a
maximum likelihood criterion-based test, with two hypothe-
ses: an Si symbol plus noise, indicating that the SFD has
not started yet, versus only noise, indicating that the SFD
is starting. ARX completes early SFD detection when the
latter is more likely.] Note that early SFD detection is nec-
essary, as ARX cannot know how many received Si symbols
were necessary for timing acquisition (see Section 2.3.1).
In the mean time, ATX chooses a late SFD commit delay
tSFDLC and remains silent until ARX signals that timing acqui-
sition was successful, thus providing t0 modulo Tpsym. Then,
after an appropriately chosen (we explain how shortly) delay
τ < Tpsym, ATX begins transmitting a sequence of preamble
tED
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Figure 8: Distance-decreasing relay attack on the
preamble.
symbols Si. This is repeated until ARX signals that the SFD
was detected, providing the exact value of t0. Immediately
afterwards, ATX switches to the transmitting of a standard
compliant SFD, beginning from tSFDLC into the SFD.
In contrast to a standard-compliant preamble (Fig. 1), the
preamble generated by ATX (Fig. 8) begins with a number
of 0 preamble symbols, and the SFD begins with a tSFDLC -long
part of an Si symbol, instead of the standard-compliant 0.
As we show in Section 4, this diﬀerence is small enough for
HRX to synchronize correctly.
The relay time-gain achieved by this attack is trelay =
tSFDLC − tSFDED . This determines the choice of τ , as Tpsym−τ =
(tSFDLC − tSFDED ) mod Tpsym. Note that nothing prevents the
adversary from choosing tSFDLC > Tpsym. Rather, the hard
upper-bound on the time-gain achievable by the preamble
attack is Tsfd.
3.4 Attack on the Payload
The attack on the payload is performed on a symbol by
symbol basis. ARX performs an early detection attack, ﬁrst
choosing an early detection delay tED  Tsym. It acts only
on the ﬁrst tED nanoseconds of the symbol (Fig. 9), ef-
fectively performing on-oﬀ keying demodulation (OOK) in
place of BPPM demodulation, ignoring deliberately most
of the BPPM symbol. [Details: ARX employs a maxi-
mum likelihood test with the hypotheses: signal plus noise,
in which case the symbol is demodulated to 0, versus only
noise, in which case the symbol is demodulated to 1.] The
time tED can be made arbitrarily small, it determines the
attack’s performance. The value optimal for performance is
dictated by the channel delay spread Tspread, as we show in
Section 4. After demodulation, ARX signals the result to
ATX.
In the mean time, ATX performs a late commit attack.
ATX begins the transmission of a symbol Tsym/2 before the
symbol’s bit value is received from ARX. At ﬁrst, ATX does
not know what bit the symbol should carry, thus it always
begins the symbol transmission with a pulse of energy E0.
Once the bit value is received, ATX acts accordingly: If it is
a 0, it transmits nothing in the 1-block of the symbol; if it
is a 1, it transmits a pulse with energy E1 > E0. (The opti-
mal ratio between E0 and E1, γ = E0/E1 is determined in
Section 4.) This attack exploits the fact that HRX performs
a simple energy comparison to demodulate. The late com-
mit delay is tLC = Tsym/2. The relay time-gain due to this
attack is trelay = tLC− tED ≤ Tsym/2, considerably less than
the upper-bound due to the preamble part of the attack.
Details. For clarity, above we assumed a symbol with
time-hopping oﬀset δn = 0. However, the time-hopping se-
quence does not aﬀect the time-gain of the attack. Indeed,
assume that the early detection and late commit delays with
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Figure 9: Distance decreasing relay attack on the
payload symbol.
time-hopping oﬀset δn = 0 are denoted by t
0
ED and t
0
LC, re-
spectively. Next, consider mounting these attacks in the case
δn > 0. Because δn is publicly known, the adversary sim-
ply shifts early detection and late commit in time. Hence,
tED = t
0
ED + δnTc and tLC = t
0
LC + δnTc, and consequently
trelay = t
0
LC + δnTc − t0ED − δnTc = t0LC − t0ED = t0relay.
3.5 Processing Delays
An additional factor that reduces the relay time-gain, and
hence the amount by which the distance can be decreased,
are the ARX’s and ATX’s processing delays for the IEEE
802.15.4a channel and for the adversarial channel. We dis-
cuss these delays here, and argue that it is feasible to keep
them in the order of nanoseconds (or a few meters). We
focus on the payload, as it is the bottleneck in terms of
the achieved delay (the adversary has much more time ﬂex-
ibility during the preamble). We distinguish two cases: (i)
ARX and ATX integrated into one device, with appropriate
shielding and directional antennas, and (ii) remote ARX and
ATX. The latter case can lead to a broader scope of attacks,
as the adversary has the ﬂexibility of placing its devices close
to the corresponding victim devices. On the downside, re-
mote ARX and ATX are subject to an additional processing
delay, due to communication over the adversarial channel.
We ﬁrst consider the processing delay related to the com-
munication with the honest devices, which applies in both
(i) and (ii). At ARX the delay consists of the processing
due to demodulation, after the necessary signal has been
received. With an approximate, linearized maximum likeli-
hood test7 the processing delay would be in the order of a
few nanoseconds. At ATX, the delay is of the same order:
after the bit value is received from ARX, the transmitter
only needs to proceed with or abort the transmission of a
previously known burst of pulses (Fig. 9).
In case (ii), there is an additional delay due to commu-
nication over the adversarial channel: more precisely, the
delay of putting the bit value on the adversarial channel at
ARX, and demodulating it at ATX. The exact numbers de-
pend heavily on the technology ARX and ATX use to com-
municate. The adversary is most likely to choose a wireless
communication medium, due to its faster propagation speed,
but even more so because of the ease of attack deployment
compared to a wired channel.
We emphasize that the adversarial channel has unusual
requirements. It does not require a high bit-rate, as the ad-
versary only needs to transmit a single bit every 1μs. How-
ever, the bit has to be transmitted as fast as possible. Many
wireless technologies, even those with very high bit-rates,
such as 802.11n, are not suitable: They achieve these high
7Details: The approximate decision consists in comparing∑
ym,npm,n to a pre-computed threshold [32].
bit-rates through large modulation constellation sizes, rather
than a short symbol duration. One valid option is IR-UWB
with on-oﬀ keying, and a receiver similar to the ED receiver
described in Section 3.4. Naturally, the adversary will ig-
nore the regulations and transmit with a power high enough
to achieve a negligible error rate. To mitigate the multipath
delay spread, a highly directive antenna can be used, as pro-
posed for a narrow-band communication system in [33]. The
coherent two-level PSK scheme proposed in [33] can also be
used as the adversarial channel: It reports bit duration of
only 1.6ns. Overall, in case (ii), a processing delay in the
order of 10ns (3.5m) seems feasible.
4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the distance-
decreasing relay attacks with a packet-based system sim-
ulator developed in MATLAB. We simulate a full IEEE
802.15.4a system including all the operations necessary to
receive a packet: timing acquisition, estimation of the chan-
nel energy-delay proﬁle, SFD detection, and data decoding.
The physical layer is simulated with an accuracy of 100 ps.
As explained in Section 2.1, we conﬁne ourselves to the
two mandatory IEEE 802.15.4a modes (LPRF and HPRF).
The standard suggests using the LPRF mode with energy-
detection receivers operating in environments with a high
multipath delay spread. For energy-detection receivers op-
erating in environments with low delay spread, using the
HPRF mode is preferable. Following these suggestions, we
therefore use two diﬀerent channel models introduced in Sec-
tion 2.2 to evaluate the LPRF and HPRFmodes: The NLOS
model for LPRF and the LOS model for HPRF.
Our main performance metrics are the packet error rate
(PER) and the synchronization error rate (SER). We con-
sider a packet to be in error if it was not acquired during
synchronization or if at least one of its data bits is in er-
ror [Details: after the mandatory RS decoding]. We con-
sider synchronization to be in error if the packet is not de-
tected (missed detection) or if the synchronization is oﬀ by
too much for data decoding to be performed correctly (false
alarm). Conﬁdence intervals shown are at the 95% level.
The signal to noise ratio (SNR) is deﬁned as SNR =
Ep
N0
where Ep is the received energy per pulse (after the convolu-
tion of the pulse with the impulse response of the channel).
To evaluate the cost of the attack, we compare the benign
case performance (honest receiver and transmitter) with the
performance under attack. We then express the cost as the
diﬀerence in SNR (between the two cases) necessary for the
same performance (SER, PER). This tells us by what fac-
tor the adversary needs to improve the received signal level
to obtain the same performance as in the case of an honest
execution of the protocol. He can achieve this by using a
high-gain antenna, by transmitting with a higher power, or
by moving closer to the victim transceivers.
Details. In all our simulations, we use the ternary pream-
ble code number 5 of length Npcode = 31 given by the stan-
dard. The values chosen for tSFDED and t
SFD
LC are chosen with
respect to the structure of this code.
Outline. First, we determine the performance of attacks
on the preamble and on the payload individually. Second,
we look at the whole system, putting all the components
together, thus allowing us to assess the overall performance
of the distance-decreasing relay attack.
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Figure 12: Performance loss ΔSNR
with respect to benign case at
ﬁxed SER = 10−2 versus tSFDED and
tSFDLC for LPRF and HPRF.
4.1 Attack on the Preamble
An honest receiver performing SFD detection takes the
entire length Tsfd of the SFD into account. For LPRF this
equals Tsfd = 31.8 μs, for HPRF Tsfd = 7.95μs.
Fig. 10 shows the SER for an honest receiver, as well as
for an adversary that performs early SFD detection with dif-
ferent early SFD detection delays tSFDED . The curves shown
here are for LPRF. Not surprisingly, the earlier an adver-
sary performs SFD detection, the more additional received
power with respect to an honest receiver it is going to cost
him to reach a given level of SER. If we ﬁx SER = 10−2,
detecting the SFD at tSFDED = 3.712 μs costs the adversary
ΔSNR = 2.8dB in additional received power, detecting at
tSFDED = 0.128 μs entails a cost of ΔSNR = 11.2dB.
For tSFDED , we only consider values shorter than the length
of the ﬁrst SFD symbol. Larger values for tSFDED do not make
much sense for the adversary because they also force him to
commit after the ﬁrst SFD symbol, which is only possible at
a considerable additional cost. This can be seen in Fig. 11,
which shows the SER of an adversary that commits late, at
time tSFDLC into the SFD. Again, the results shown are for
LPRF. Committing at tSFDLC = 8 · 128ns = 1.02μs, or earlier
is within 0.6dB of the benign case and thus comes at prac-
tically no additional cost at a target SER of 10−2. Commit-
ting later comes at an ever increasing cost: Committing at
tSFDLC = 29 · 128ns = 3.712 μs, already costs ΔSNR = 7.5dB.
[Details: According to the preamble and SFD codes, no
pulse is sent between the 29th code symbol of the ﬁrst SFD
symbol and the ﬁrst code symbol of the third SFD sym-
bol. So committing anywhere between tSFDLC = 3.712 μs and
tSFDLC = 63 · 128ns = 8.064 μs is equivalent to committing at
tSFDLC = 8.064 μs, which costs more than ΔSNR = 9dB.]
Results for HPRF are generally close to those of LPRF
shown so far. Performing ED at tSFDED = 928ns, for exam-
ple, costs the adversary about ΔSNR = 2.9dB, compared
to 2.8dB for LPRF. This can be seen in Fig. 12 where we
show the additional cost ΔSNR with respect to an honest
receiver versus tSFDED and t
SFD
LC for both LPRF and HPRF
and a ﬁxed SER of 10−2. The corresponding SNR values
were found via interpolation of curves such as those shown
in Figures 10 and 11. Results for ED are close and within
0.5dB. Late commit generally costs about 1dB more in the
case of HPRF. Note the diﬀerent time scales that are due
to the fact that a preamble symbol in HPRF is four times
shorter.
An important observation is that none of the curves show-
ing the performance under attack exhibits an error ﬂoor.
This indicates that by increasing the SNR, the attack suc-
cess rate can be made arbitrarily large. The same holds for
the payload, as we will see shortly.
Alternative Receivers. We also evaluated a receiver
that performs SFD detection using a sub-optimal correlation
method (2dB performance loss compared to the baseline re-
ceiver). This receiver is also vulnerable to the attack, and
the attack’s cost in terms of ΔSNR is close to the cost in
the case of the baseline receiver: more precisely, up to 1dB
greater (for tSFDLC in the order of Tpsym).
4.2 Attack on the Payload
We now look at the eﬀect of ED and LC on the pay-
load. The following results do not contain eﬀects of synchro-
nization: We assume here that the receiving party, ARX in
the case of ED and HRX in the case of LC, is able to per-
fectly synchronize to each packet. Perfect synchronization
here means that an oracle returns the exact packet time-of-
arrival. (Hence, there are no false alarms or missed detec-
tions.) The channel energy-delay proﬁle is still estimated;
but the estimation is performed under the assumption that
the packet boundaries are perfectly aligned. In the case of
LC, we further assume that the packet sent by ATX does
not contain any errors due to a preceding ED. For all of the
results presented here, we further assume a payload of 128
bits. We consider 128 bits a conservative upper-bound on
the length of a ranging message in a secure ranging protocol.
Fig. 13(a) shows the PER at diﬀerent SNRs for the LPRF
mode. We show the performance curves for a benign receiver
and an adversary performing ED at diﬀerent ED delays tED.
The optimal ED delay for the adversary is in the order of
the channel delay spread and found to be tOPTED = 68ns in
the present example that uses the NLOS channel model.
Deciding on the symbol at tOPTED introduces a loss of about
1.7dB with respect to the benign curve at a packet error rate
of PER = 10−2. This can also be seen in Fig. 13(b). Here
we show the loss in SNR, ΔSNR, with respect to the benign
case versus the ED delay tED for a target packet error rate of
PER = 10−2. The curve has been obtained from curves such
as those shown in Fig. 13(a) via interpolation. Detecting
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Figure 13: (a): PER versus SNR for the payload comparing benign
performance to ED with varying ED delays tED. The optimal tED is in
the order of the channel delay spread and gives a loss of about 1.7dB.
(b): More compact representation of the data in (a), showing the loss
ΔSNR with respect to the benign case versus tED for a ﬁxed PER of
10−2.
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Figure 14: PER for LC on the pay-
load with varying energy ratios γ.
The optimal ratio at γOPT = 0.35
gives a loss of about 4dB with re-
spect to the benign setting.
after tOPTED gives a slightly worse performance because the
adversary then merely integrates more noise instead of useful
signal. Performing ED much earlier than tOPTED results in
substantially larger loss because a large part of the useful
signal energy is lost: Deciding at tED = 32ns, for example,
introduces a loss of 5.6dB.
Fig. 14 shows the performance of LC on the payload in
the case of LPRF. As explained in Section 3.4, the LC delay
tLC is ﬁxed to tLC = Tsym/2 = 512ns. We show the PER for
diﬀerent ratios γ of the energies E0 and E1 corresponding to
the signal energies transmitted by the adversary during the
0-block and 1-block, respectively. E1 here corresponds to
the energy a benign receiver would transmit and E0 is typ-
ically smaller (see also Section 3.4). A ratio of γOPT = 0.35
gives optimal performance throughout the whole operating
range, thus this is the energy ratio we will use in all subse-
quent simulations. The optimal ratio gives a loss of about
4dB with respect to the benign case.
For HPRF, we do not show any curves because the results
are very similar. With HPRF and the LOS channel, the
optimal ED delay is tOPTED = 48ns. [Details: Note that this
is signiﬁcantly larger than the channel delay spread. The
reason is that in the HPRF mode, a burst of 16 pulses is
sent during the payload, spreading the received signal wider
in time.] The diﬀerence in SNR, with respect to the benign
case, is 2dB versus 1.7dB with LPRF. For LC, we ﬁnd the
optimal energy ratio to be γOPT = 0.35 as well, and the
corresponding loss of 3.9dB is close to the 4dB found for
LPRF.
Uncoded Transmission. We also look at transmissions
that do not use the RS code. We did so to make sure that
it is not the RS code that allows the attack to succeed (by
masking the errors introduced by the attack). It turns out
that this is not the case: Without the RS code, the ΔSNR
between the benign and attack case is practically the same
as for the coded case.
Alternative Receivers. We also evaluated a simplistic
receiver that demodulates without weighting with the esti-
mated energy-delay proﬁle (2dB performance loss compared
to the weighted decision). Such a receiver is vulnerable to
the attack as well, and the attack’s cost in terms of ΔSNR
is within 0.5dB of the cost for the baseline receiver.
4.3 Overall Performance of the Attack
We now establish the overall performance of the distance-
decreasing relay attack. As the relay attack involves two
transmissions, ARX and HRX potentially have diﬀerent re-
ceived SNRs, which we will denote by SNRED and SNRLC.
This diﬀerence can be a result of the topology, but it can also
be introduced by the adversary. Depending on his abilities,
an adversary can, for example, send with a higher power in
order to increase SNRLC, or move closer to HTX, or use a
directive antenna to increase SNRED. Combined with the
observation that the same relay time-gain, trelay, can be ob-
tained with diﬀerent combinations of ED and LC delays, this
gives the adversary room for a trade-oﬀ: Depending on the
SNR values achievable for SNRED (SNRLC, respectively) the
adversary can choose to perform ED earlier or later (commit
earlier or later, respectively). If SNRLC is high with respect
to SNRED, the adversary will prefer to commit late in order
to be able to detect late as well. If SNRLC is low with re-
spect to SNRED, the adversary will prefer to detect early in
order to be able to commit early.
In our analysis, Fig. 15 will serve as a benchmark. It shows
the PER in the benign case for both LPRF and HPRF.
Packet sizes of 128 and 1016 data bits are shown. A packet
size of 1016 bits is the maximum packet size allowed by the
standard; as stated earlier, 128 bits correspond to a con-
servative length of a ranging message. In LPRF the factor
limiting performance is the payload. This can be seen by
observing that the LPRF curve for the shorter packet size
is almost identical to the benign curve in Fig. 13 (which as-
sumes perfect synchronization). For HPRF the opposite is
true, the limiting factor is the synchronization. This can
be seen in Fig. 15 where the size of the packet hardly inﬂu-
ences the PER. [Details: The reason is that in HPRF 16
times more energy is sent in a payload symbol compared to
a preamble pulse, whereas in LPRF it is only 4 times more.]
Fig. 16(a) shows the probability of success for LPRF and
an attack that tries to gain 480ns when relaying a 128bit
packet between HTX and HRX. This relay time-gain is equiv-
alent to a 144m distance decrease between HTX and HRX.8
8Here we assume for simplicity that the processing delays at
the adversarial transceivers are zero. Processing delays are
discussed in Section 3.5.
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Figure 16: Probability of success, Ps, for an attack trying to achieve a
distance decrease of 144m. Packet length is 128bits. (a): With LPRF,
Ps > 99% is reached at a cost of (ΔSNRED = 4dB,ΔSNRLC = 6dB). (b):
For HPRF (7dB, 7dB) gives Ps > 99%.
The results shown are for diﬀerent combinations of SNRED
and SNRLC. For every SNR combination, the probabil-
ity of success that is reported corresponds to the tuple of
(tSFDED , t
SFD
LC , tED)
9 yielding best performance among all the
tuples that achieve the given relay time-gain of 480ns. In
the benign case we achieve a PER of approximately 10−2
at an SNR of around 8dB, see Fig. 15. In Fig. 16(a), a
probability of success of Ps = 0.9869 is achieved for the
pair (SNRED = 12dB,SNRLC = 14dB). For all pairs above
(12dB, 14dB) the probability of success is above 99%. With
respect to an honest transmitter-receiver pair, an adversary
thus needs an additional 4dB in SNR for ED and an addi-
tional 6dB for LC, in order to reduce the distance by 144m
with a probability of success in the order of 99%. Attaining
SNR values in this range would not pose much of a challenge
to the adversary.
The corresponding HPRF results, decreasing the distance
by 144m, are shown in Fig. 16(b). A probability of suc-
cess of Ps = 0.9875 is reached at (11dB, 11dB). Compared
with Fig. 15, the additional cost is 7dB for both ED and
LC. Compared with LPRF, we thus see that decreasing the
distance by the same amount costs a bit more in HPRF.
This was to be expected for several reasons. First of all we
have seen that, contrary to LPRF, the performance is not
limited by the payload but by the synchronization. We can
thus not hope to achieve the ED/LC performance of the
payload-only attacks shown in Figures 13 and 14. [Details:
Second, to obtain a given relay time-gain on the preamble is
more costly for HPRF because of the closer spacing of the
pulses. We have seen in Fig. 12 that detecting early at the
ith code symbol or committing late at the jth code symbol
costs roughly the same for both LPRF and HPRF. The dis-
tance decrease achieved corresponds to (j − i) · L · Tc which
depends on the length of a code symbol L · Tc. At the same
cost, the distance decrease achieved by HPRF is thus four
times shorter than for LPRF.]
Increasing the packet length to its allowable maximum of
1016 bits decreases slightly the probability of success: To
reach Ps > 99% we see virtually no cost increase for HPRF.
For LPRF the cost in SNRED and SNRLC increases by about
1.5dB each. A smaller distance decrease obviously comes at
a lower cost: e.g., for an attack decreasing the distance by
9Recall that tLC = 512ns is ﬁxed, thus limiting to some
extent the degrees of freedom on the payload part.
100m for HPRF with 128bit packets, we found the addi-
tional cost for Ps ≈ 99% to be 5dB for ED and 4dB for LC.
Compared to the corresponding attack achieving a decrease
of 144m, this signiﬁes a 2dB smaller cost in SNRED and a
3dB smaller cost in SNRLC.
5. DISCUSSION
Private Ranging Mode. As explained in Section 2.1.3,
the standard includes a private ranging mode that allows
the legitimate participants to secretly agree on the pream-
ble codes used in the ranging packets. Hence, the adversary
does not know the exact structure of the preamble, which
makes the attack on the preamble harder. Nevertheless, the
honest devices can only choose among 8 allowable preamble
codes, which oﬀers little security. First, the adversary could
simply guess the codes with a decent success probability 1
64
.
Second, the adversary could detect a packet using, in par-
allel, all 8 allowable codes. This can be done entirely in
the digital domain10 by correlating the received signal with
each of the 8 codes and choosing the one with the highest
correlation output. What additionally helps the adversary
is the fact that these codes were designed to have minimum
cross-correlation. In summary, the private ranging mode
only moderately increases the complexity of the distance-
decreasing relay attack, and cannot be considered a valid
countermeasure. Furthermore, it seems the private rang-
ing mode was designed for more complex coherent receivers
only: The preamble parameters that the private ranging
mode employs imply strong inter-symbol interference (ISI),
which a non-coherent receiver, such as the one used in our
investigation, cannot cope with well.
Possible Countermeasures. Two factors determine the
quality of a countermeasure. The ﬁrst is the eﬀectiveness:
the maximum distance by which the adversary can decrease
the distance with the countermeasure in place. The second
factor is the cost: how much the countermeasure degrades
benign case performance (if no attack is taking place), com-
pared to a system without countermeasures deployed.
The simplest countermeasure is to decrease payload sym-
bol duration [18], as the distance-decreasing attack cannot
decrease the distance by more than one symbol duration.
10This is much easier and cost-eﬃcient than, e.g., adding
circuitry to the analog part of the receiver.
This applies to the BPPM modulation: if the symbol du-
ration is Tsym, the time-gain of the the attack we proposed
in this paper is at most Tsym/2.
11 This solution can be im-
plemented even within the IEEE 802.15.4a standard, some
non-mandatory modes have symbols as short as 32ns. How-
ever, reducing Tsym is not without eﬀect on the benign per-
formance. The ﬁrst problem is ISI, which manifests itself
if the symbol duration is close or below the channel delay
spread. Low-complexity non-coherent receivers cannot cope
well with ISI and even if some solutions exist, they entail a
loss of 5−10dB in the benign case [34]. Furthermore, shorter
symbols have less resilience to multi-user interference.
Alternatively, the symbol duration can be preserved, but
the honest receiver can choose to only take into account the
beginning of the symbol [19], essentially performing early
detection. This is particularly attractive in our case, as
switching from BPPM demodulation to OOK demodula-
tion signiﬁcantly reduces the achievable time-gain: Indeed,
tLC ≥ trelay can be reduced from 512ns to a value in the
order of the channel delay spread Tspread ≈ 60ns (for opti-
mal OOK performance). This corresponds to at most 20m
distance-decrease (assuming an unrealistic instant ED and
no processing delays). This solution does not induce any ad-
ditional ISI and is compliant with the mandatory modes of
the standard. However, our simulations evaluating payload
early detection show that OOK decreases the benign case
performance by roughly 1.5dB because half of the available
information is discarded. Coding could potentially compen-
sated for this degradation.
We also investigate another countermeasure, whose main
idea is to detect the non standard signal sent by the ad-
versary during the payload LC attack. With this counter-
measure, the receiver records, for every bit, the energy in
the 0-block of the symbol, and compares the distribution of
these energies for the 0 bits (bits that were decoded as a 0)
with the 1 bits (decoded as a 1). In the benign case, the
0-blocks of the 0 bits carry more energy (Fig. 2), whereas
under attack these energies are the same (Fig. 9). To distin-
guish these cases, one can use a robust statistical test, such
as the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test. This countermeasure
prevents the attack presented in Section 3.4 with virtually
no degradation of benign case performance. However, an
adversary can modify the attack (vary the energy levels be-
tween symbols) to severely degrade the performance of this
countermeasure.
Finally, another direction might be to use secret preamble
codes, known only to the communicating honest nodes. This
could make (early) preamble detection infeasible, at least
within the constrained time budget available to the adver-
sary to mount the relay attack. It is uncertain, but worth
investigating, how such random codes without nice auto-
correlation properties would aﬀect the benign case perfor-
mance. Alternatively, secret time-hopping sequences could
be used to make early detection of payload symbols more
diﬃcult. This would also require further investigation.
Isolating HRX from HTX. In our threat model, we
assume that the honest receiver, HRX, cannot receive sig-
11We note that the attack proposed in this paper can be fur-
ther improved (in terms of the achieved distance-decrease),
by employing late commit techniques in the fashion of [19].
However, the additional challenge is the weighting by the
channel mask performed by the baseline receiver. We leave
the investigation of such attacks for future work.
nals sent by the honest transmitter, HTX. This is inher-
ent in some scenarios, e.g., picking virtual pockets [15]. In
other scenarios, such as the watch-tracking example given in
the Introduction, the adversary has to make an extra eﬀort
to prevent the tag from communicating with the monitor-
ing system. A simple way of achieving this is to place the
stolen item in a Faraday cage with one adversarial trans-
mitter connected via a wired link to the second transmitter
placed outside the Faraday cage.
Although constructing such a Faraday cage is simple (even
today, shoplifters use “booster bags” coated with aluminium
foil [35]), an interesting question is whether shielding HRX
from HTX is really necessary? The answer is yes, as long as
ARX, the adversarial receiver, takes the same or more time
to acquire the packet as HRX. In this case, by the time ATX
starts transmitting the preamble (Fig. 8), HRX is already
synchronized to HTX’s signal. Even a much stronger signal
from ATX cannot undo this – the attack fails. However,
if ARX acquires the packet ﬁrst, ATX can start sending
the preamble while HRX is still in the process of acquir-
ing HTX’s signal. The attack would succeed, provided that
the signal level of ATX exceeds the one of HTX by a large
enough margin. The performance of this attack depends on
the details of the synchronization algorithm. We plan to
investigate this as part of future work.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have investigated the vulnerability of the IR-UWB
standard, IEEE 802.15.4a, to physical layer distance-decreas-
ing relay attacks. We demonstrated, for the mandatory
modes of the standard, that an attack decreasing the mea-
sured distance by 140m achieves an impressive success rate
of 99% at a cost of just a few dB in SNR with respect to
normal system operation; a further increase in SNR allows
the adversary to make the success rate arbitrarily large. In
terms of future work, we plan to further investigate possible
countermeasures and alternative PHY attacks.
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